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Abstract. Attack-Defence Trees (ADTs) are well-suited to assess pos-
sible attacks to systems and the efficiency of counter-measures. In this
paper, we first enrich the available constructs with reactive patterns that
cover further security scenarios, and equip all constructs with attributes
such as time and cost to allow quantitative analyses. Then, ADTs are
modelled as (an extension of) Asynchronous Multi-Agents Systems—
EAMAS. The ADT–EAMAS transformation is performed in a system-
atic manner that ensures correctness. The transformation allows us to
quantify the impact of different agents configurations on metrics such
as attack time. Using EAMAS also permits parametric verification: we
derive constraints for property satisfaction. Our approach is exercised on
several case studies using the Uppaal and IMITATOR tools.
1 Introduction
Over the past ten years of security analysis, a multitude of formalisms has been
developed to study interactions between attacker and defender parties. Attack-
defence trees stand out among these, as a graphical, straightforward formalism
of great modelling versatility. However, research is thus far focused on bipartite
graph characterisations, where nodes belong to either the attacker or defender
party. In real security scenarios each of these parties may be formed of multiple
agents. Agents distribution over the tree nodes, i.e. which agent performs which
task for which goal, determines not only the performance but also the feasibility
of an attack or defence strategy. Studying these distributions is thus paramount.
To analyse the impact of different agents distributions, we model attack-
defence trees in an agent-aware formalism. Our approach permits quantifying
performance metrics (e.g. cost and time) of attack/defence strategies under dis-
tinct agents coalitions. Employing modern verification tools such as IMITATOR,
‹ This work was partially funded by the NWO project SEQUOIA (grant 15474), EU
project SUCCESS (102112) and the PHC van Gogh PAMPAS. The work of Arias
and Petrucci has been supported by the BQR project AMoJAS.
we determine the feasibility of coalition strategies, and synthesise the value of
the attributes that make them feasible, such as the maximum time allowed for
a defence mechanism to be triggered. This way, we make an important step
towards richer ADT representations for real-world security analysis.
Contributions. Concretely, in this paper we introduce: (i) a unified scheme
for ADT representation with counter- and sequential operators, including a new
construct ; (ii) a formalism—EAMAS—to model ADTs where all nodes have
attributes, and can be operated by different agents ; (iii) compositional and sound
transformation rules from ADT to EAMAS; (iv) measurements of the impact of
different agents coalitions on attack performance metrics, such as time, exercised
on several case studies; (v) synthesis of ADT attributes—by encoding them as
EAMAS parameters—for feasibility analysis of attack/defence strategies.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we review the basic no-
tions of ADTs, using a unified syntactic and semantic representation. Sec. 3
reviews the AMAS formalism, which we extend in Sec. 4 to model ADTs en-
riched with attributes. Sec. 5 presents graph-based transformation patterns to
model each ADT construct as an (extended) AMAS model. Such compositional
modelling avoids state space issues; we prove it correct for our semantics and
illustrate it in our running example. The effectiveness of our approach is demon-
strated in Sec. 6, by using two state-of-the-art verification tools to quantitatively
analyse three case studies from the literature. This work concludes in Sec. 7,
where we finally draw possible lines of future research.
2 Attack-Defence Trees
2.1 The basic ADT model and related work
Attack trees are well-known tree-like representations of attack scenarios, that
allow for evaluating the security of complex systems to the desired degree of
refinement [MO06]. The root of the tree is the attacker’s goal, and the children
of a node represent refinements of the node’s goal into sub-goals. The tree leaves
are (possibly quantified) foreseeable attacker’s actions. For instance, if the attack
goal is to Steal Jewels from a museum (SJ), where burglars must break in (attack
leaf bi) and force a display (fd), the attack tree is: SJ “ ANDpbi, fdq.
Attack-defence trees (ADTs, [KMRS11]) are an extension of attack trees in-
cluding possible counteractions of a defender, thus representing security scenarios
as an interplay between attacker’s and defender’s actions. This can model mech-
anisms triggered by the occurrence of specified opposite actions. So for instance,
the jewels burglary will succeed (SJS) only if all attack actions are performed,
and the alerted police (p) doesn’t stop them: SJS “ NANDpSJ, pq, see Fig. 1.
Countering actions emerged recently to express pointwise interactions be-
tween opposite players. This can be reactive, such as the police above, or pas-
sive, such as message encryption to avoid eavesdropping in open channels. The
intuition behind the counter actions in [KMRS11] can be described as follows:
§ counter defence A “ NANDpa, dq: if attack a succeeds and the countering de-
fence d fails, then the attack goal A is successful;
§ counter attack D “ NANDpd, aq: if defence d happens and attack a fails, then
the defence goal D is successful.
Formally, we give Boolean semantics to the nodes composing ADTs as shown
in Table 1. As with counter defence/attack above, constructs are symmetric for
attack or defence goals; thus the table shows only a selection. In the graphical
SJS
pSJ
fdbi
Fig. 1: Steal Jewels
representations, triangular nodes indicate (arbitrary) sub-
trees can be the children of a gate, whereas circular (resp.
rectangular) nodes represent attack (resp. defence) leaves.
In this way, with Table 1 we extend [KMRS11] with AND/OR
gates along the lines of [KSR`18]. We further extend
notation—in accordance with these semantics—for nodes
that represent countering a defence or an attack. Thus, for
instance, the ADT jewels burglary example has the seman-
tics SJS “ bi^ fd^ p, graphically depicted as in Fig. 1.
In Table 1 we also introduce operators for a choice between a successful at-
tack and a failing defence (named no defence), and vice-versa (inhibiting attack).
These constructs are less usual in the literature [KPS14], yet they model realistic
scenarios such as attack goals succeeding by security negligence rather than by
performing an elaborated (and costly!) attack. This is of interest for quantitative
analyses of e.g. cost and probability, and thus we include them in Table 1.
Moreover, we consider sequential order operators, which lack a standard
interpretation for ADTs. The survey of [KPS14] lists several ways to model
order-dependent events: sequential enforcement, time dependent ordered-AND,
priority- or sequential-AND, etc. For attack trees, in the sequentially ordered
conjunction (SAND) of [JKM`15], attacks succeed when all children occurred in
the required order. This abstracts away the exact time of occurrence of events;
with few exceptions, e.g. [C¸Y07], this is the preferred approach in the literature
[SSSW98, BLP`06, KPS14, JKM`15, KSR`18]. Therefore SANDs describe the
order in which actions will take place, rather than a potential order of events.
Their role is to enforce sequential events and rule out parallel executions, which
is a fundamental construct when working with multi-agent systems. For instance,
Steal Jewels (SJ) in Fig. 1 is modelled with an AND gate. Say that breaking in
(bi) takes 10 min and forcing the display (fd) 5 min. If two attackers operate
in parallel, analysing the ADT can conclude that SJ succeeds after a 10 min at-
tack. But fd depends logically on bi, since the display can only be forced after
breaking in. Using instead a SAND gate for SJ enforces this sequentiality so that
attacks cannot take less than 15 min. We integrate such SAND gates in our ADT
framework, as the sequential and attack/defence in Table 1.
We further introduce SNAND gates: sequential gates that have attacks and de-
fences as children. To the best of our knowledge, this is novel in a typed setting
where subtrees (rather than leaves) can be assigned attack/defence goals. This
contribution is conservative: it extends the SAND gates of [JKM`15] to coincide
with previous works on sequential operators in defence-aware representations,
e.g. attack-defence diagrams [HKKS16]. We distinguish two scenarios: a success-
ful attack followed by a failed defence (named failed reactive defence in Table 1),
and vice versa. We disregard the second scenario as uninteresting—it models de-
fence goals which depend on attacks failing by themselves—and focus on the
first one. SNANDs then model an attack goal that must overcome some reactive
defence, triggered only after the incoming attack has been detected.
Name Domains Graphics Semantics
Attack a P Σa a a
Defence d P Σd d d
And attack A, a1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , an P Σa
A
a1 an¨ ¨ ¨
A “ a1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ an
Or defence D, d1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , dn P Σd
D
d1 dn¨ ¨ ¨
D “ d1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ dn
Counter defence
A, a P Σa
d P Σd
A
a d
A “ a ^ d
No defence
A, a P Σa
d P Σd
A
a d
A “ a _ d
Inhibiting attack
D, d P Σd
a P Σa
D
d a
D “ d_ a
Sequential
and attack
A, a1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , an P Σa
A
a1 an¨ ¨ ¨
A “ a1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ an
Failed reactive
defence
A, a P Σa
d P Σd
A
a d
A “ a ^ d
Table 1: ADT constructs (selection) and their semantics
2.2 Attributes and agents for ADTs
Attributes (also “parameters” and “gains” [BLP`06, AN15, KSR`18]) are nu-
meric properties of attack/defence nodes that allow for quantitative analyses.
Typical attributes include cost, time, and probability: in the Steal Jewels exam-
ple, the 10 min it takes to break in is a time attribute of this attack leaf. If all
nodes in an ADT have a time attribute, one can compute the min/max time
required by the attack goal, whereas in general attributes are associated to tree
leaves. As in [ALRS19], attributes can be parameters over which we synthesize
constraints indicating which attribute values can lead to a successful attack.
General attributes. We extend attributes to all constructs (i.e. nodes) in
ADTs, because a construct may not be fully described by just its children. An at-
tribute is then given by a node’s initial (aka intrinsic) value, and a computation
function. For example, refine bi to be an AND gate with children pick main lock
(pml, 7 min) and saw padlock (sp, 2 min). Then it may still take an extra minute
to enter stealthily and locate the correct display, to be counted after pml and sp
have succeeded. In general, when the goal of a gate is successful, its attribute
value is the result of its computation function applied to its intrinsic value and to
the attributes of its children. For bi, if two burglars cooperate, the computation
function is init timepbiq ` maxpinit timeppmlq, init timepspqq. This allows for
flexibility in describing different kinds of attributes, and gains special relevance
when considering coalitions of agents, as we will further illustrate in Sec. 2.3.
Agents. Each action described by an ADT construct can be performed by a
particular agent. Different attacks/defences could be handled by one or multi-
ple agents, which allows to express properties on agents coalitions. For instance,
in the original Steal Jewels example of Fig. 1, the minimal number of burglars
required to minimise the SJS attack time is two: one to do bi and another
to parallelly perform fd. If the SJ gate is changed to a SAND, then one bur-
glar suffices, since bi and fd cannot be parallelised. Upon using the refinement
bi “ ANDppml, spq, then again a coalition of two burglars minimises the attack
time, since pml and sp can be parallelised. Each node in the ADT will thus be
assigned to an agent, and a single agent can handle multiple nodes. In the gen-
eral case, the only constraint is that no agent handles both attack and defence
nodes. As shown above, specific ADTs might enforce additional constraints.
Conditional counter measures. It may happen that a countering node has
a successful or unsuccessful outcome depending on the attributes of its children.
We therefore associate conditions with countering nodes, which are Boolean
functions over the attributes of the ADT. When present, the condition then
comes as an additional constraint for the node operation to be successful.
2.3 Example: Treasure hunters
We present a simple running example in Fig. 2 that extends Fig. 1, featuring
thieves that try to steal a treasure in a museum. To achieve their goal, they first
must access the treasure room, which involves distracting and bribing a guard
(b), and forcing the secure door (f). Both actions are costly and take some time.
Two coalitions are possible: it may be that a single thief has to carry out both
actions, or there could be two thieves that collaborate to parallelise b and f.
After these actions succeed the thieves can steal the treasure (ST), which
takes a little time for opening its display stand and putting it in a bag. Then
Fig. 2: The treasure hunters
TS
pTF
ST
b f
GA
h e
(a) ADT
Name Cost Time
TS (treasure stolen)
p (police) 100e 10 min
TF (thieves fleeing)
ST (steal treasure) 2 min
b (bribe gatekeeper) 500e 1 h
f (force arm. door) 100e 2 h
GA (go away)
h (helicopter) 500e 3 min
e (emergency exit) 10 min
Condition for TS:
init timeppq ą timepSTq ` timepGAq
(b) Attributes of nodes
the thieves are ready to flee (TF), but to do
that they have to choose an escape route to
go away (GA): this can be a spectacular es-
cape in a helicopter (h), or a mundane escape
via the emergency exit (e). The helicopter is
expensive but fast while the fire exit is slower
but at no cost. These values will allow for ex-
perimenting different solutions. Furthermore,
the time to perform a successful escape can be
inversely proportional to the number of agents
involved in the robbery. This is easy to encode
via a computation function in the gate GA.
As soon as the treasure room is penetrated
(i.e. after b and f but before ST) an alarm
goes off at the police station, so while the
thieves flee the police hurries to intervene (p).
The treasure is then successfully stolen iff the
thieves have fled and the police failed to arrive
(e.g. because they were on strike6) or does so
too late. This last possibility is captured by
the additional condition associated with the
treasure stolen gate (TS), which states that
the arrival time of the police must be greater
than the time for the thieves to steal the trea-
sure and go away.
3 Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems
Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems (AMAS, [JPDM18]) are a modern semantic
model for the study of agents’ strategies in asynchronous systems. They offer
a (succinctly represented) analysis framework capable of efficient reachability
checks even on non-trivial models [JPDM18]. By linking protocols to agents,
AMAS are a natural compositional formalism for analysing multi-agent systems.
Technically, AMAS are similar to networks of automata that synchronize
on shared actions, and interleave local transitions to execute asynchronously
[FHMV95, LPQ10, JPDM18]. Works that give semantics to attack-trees via
automata usually do not consider defence nodes [C¸Y07, KSR`18]. The attack-
defence diagrams of [HKKS16] use stochastic timed automata as a semantic base:
this grants them ample expressive power, but also entails large state spaces and
undecidable reachability in the general case, which AMAS circumvents.
Definition 1 (Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems, [JPDM18]). An asyn-
chronous multi-agent system (AMAS) consists of n agents A “ t1, . . . , nu, where
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_police_revolts_in_Argentina
each agent has an associated tuple Ai “ pLi, ιi, Acti, Pi, Tiq including (i) a set of
local states Li “ tl
1
i , l
2
i , . . . , l
ni
i u; (ii) an initial state ιi P Li; (iii) a set of actions
Acti “ ta
1
i , a
2
i , . . . , a
mi
i u; (iv) a local protocol Pi : Li Ñ 2
Acti which selects the
actions available at each local state; and (v) a (partial) local transition function
Ti Ď Li ˆActi ˆ Li s.t. pli, a, l
1
iq P Ti for some l
1
i P Li iff a P Pipliq.
Sets Acti need not be disjoint. Act “
Ť
iPA Acti and Loc “
Ť
iPA Li are the
set of all actions and all local states, respectively. For each action a P Act, the set
Agentpaq “ ti P A | a P Actiu contains all agents that can perform action a. The
parallel composition of AMAS is given by Interleaved Interpreted Systems, which
extend AMAS with variables and define global states and global transitions.
Definition 2 (Interleaved Interpreted System, [JPDM18]). Let PV be
a set of propositional variables. An interleaved interpreted system (IIS) is an
AMAS extended with (i) a set of global states S Ď
śn
i“1 Li; (ii) an initial
state ι P S; (iii) a (partial) global transition function T : S ˆ Act Ñ S s.t.
@i P Agentpaq, T ps1, aq “ s2 iff Tips
i
1, aq “ s
i
2, whereas @i P AzAgentpaq, s
i
1 “ s
i
2,
where si
1
is the i-th local state of s1; and (iv) a valuation function V : S Ñ 2
PV .
4 Extending the AMAS model
As defined in [JPDM18], AMAS do not include attributes. Therefore, to model
ADTs we now define Extended AMAS, associating attributes to local transitions.
Definition 3 (Extended Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems). An Ex-
tended Asynchronous Multi-Agent System (EAMAS) is an AMAS where each
local transition function t P LT “
Ť
iPA Ti is equipped with a finite set of vari-
ables AT t “ tv
1
t , . . . , v
k
t u, called attributes, over a domain Dt “ d
1
t ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ d
k
t .
Let AT “
Ť
tPT AT t and D “
ś
tPT Dt. Let Guards be the set of formu-
las of the form β „ 0, where β is a linear expression over attributes of AT
and „ P tă,ď,“,ě,ąu. Let FUN be all functions taking arguments in AT,
and EXPpAT ,FUN q be linear expressions over AT and FUN . Each transition
t P LT has associated (i) a message fM ptq P pt!, ?uˆtok , nokuqYtKu; (ii) a guard
fGptq P Guards; and (iii) a modification function ft : AT t Ñ EXPpAT ,FUN q.
Item (i) indicates whether t is not a synchronised transition (K), or whether
it is sending (marked with !) or receiving (?) a message P tok , noku. Guards
in item (ii) constrain transitions. Item (iii) states how to modify the associated
attributes when taking a transition. To model ADTs we must also extend IIS.
Definition 4 (Extended Interleaved Interpreted System). Let PV be a
set of propositional variables, v : AT Ñ D a valuation of the attributes, and v0
an initial valuation. An extended interleaved interpreted system (EIIS) M , or a
model, is an EAMAS extended with (i) a set of global states S Ď L1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆLnˆD; (ii) an
initial state s0 “ xpι1, . . . , ιnq,v0y P S; (iii) a global transition relation T Ď SˆActˆS
s.t. xpl1, . . . , ln,vq, a, pl
1
1, . . . , l
1
n,v
1qy P T iff: (a) Di, j P Agentpaq ^ Dti “ pli, a, l
1
iq P Ti
^ Dtj “ plj , a, l
1
jq P Tj s.t. fM ptiq “ p!,mq ^ fM ptjq “ p?,mq;
(b) @k P Azti, ju lk “ l
1
k; (c) v |ù fGptiq ^ fGptjq; (d) v
1 “ vrAT ti srAT tj s;
and (iv) a valuation function V : S Ñ 2PV , where vrAT ti srAT tj s in item (d)
indicates the substitution of attributes in the valuation v according to transitions
ti and tj, that is v
1 “ v
”Ź
vtiPAT ti
vti :“ ftipvtiq
ı ”Ź
vtj PAT tj
vtj :“ ftjpvtj q
ı
.
In the definition of the global transition relation T , item (a) specifies the syn-
chronisation of transition ti (with a sending action) and tj (with a receiving
action) that share the message m. Item (b) ensures that agents other than i and
j do not change their states in such a synchronisation. Item (c) guarantees that
the guards of ti and tj hold for the valuation v. Finally, item (d) indicates how
v1 is obtained by updating v with the attributes values modified by ti and tj .
5 EAMAS transformation of ADTs
Each ADT node is modelled as an EAMAS agent via transformation patterns.
These synchronise among themselves via shared actions. The approach is com-
positional, i.e. the resulting EIIS model of the ADT contains an agent per node
in the tree, and correct, i.e. all relevant (ADT) paths are captured by the model.
Note that unlike timed formalisms, e.g. (priced) time automata where clocks let
time pass, time in EAMAS is an attribute. This allows e.g. to give minimum and
maximum time values, and also makes EAMAS much easier to model check.
Transformation patterns. Table 2 shows how each ADT construct is trans-
formed into an agent (sub)model. Models communicate via the blue transitions.
Transformations are symmetrical for attack and defence nodes: Table 2 shows
attack patterns. A leaf signals action a or fails. For DAG ADTs where gates can
share children, self-loops in states l1, l
1
1
synchronise with all nodes that depend
on the attack. In conjunctions, (all) actions must be signaled in any order. Then,
attack A occurs, followed by the model signaling success. The conjunction fails if
any action fails. Disjunctions and counter actions operate in the expected anal-
ogous way. Sequential constructs enforce the absence of parallelism, as per the
semantics chosen for SAND and SNAND gates (see Sec. 2.1). Note that patterns use
a single order of actions: other orders are shufflings of the semantically equivalent
sequence shown in Table 2, and are thus already present in the state space.
Correctness of the transformation. Communication between two patterns
involves pairwise synchronisation, given by item (a) in Def. 4: the parent receives
the status from each child, updates its own status, and then informs its own
parent. Self-loops ensure that all parents are informed in DAG ADTs. The order
of reception is not important as long as there is a representative sequence for the
attack/defence semantics, which the patterns ensure. This covers expected action
signals, i.e. those that a parent must receive from its children to achieve its goal.
For sequences containing unexpected signals it could happen that a parent does
not receive all information from its children, thus entering a deadlock before
reaching its final state to signal success to its own parent(s). Notice that these
sequences are precisely those that inhibit the goal of the (parent) gate. Therefore,
not reaching the final state is indeed the desired behaviour.
ADT construct Agent model
Leaf node
a
l0 l1
l11
a
!a ok
!a nok
!a nok
Conjunction/disjunction nodes
A
a1 an¨ ¨ ¨
l0 l1 l2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ln lA
l11
?a1 ok ?a2 ok A
!A ok
?a
1 nok?a
2 nok...
?a
n nok
!A nok
A
a1 an¨ ¨ ¨
l0 l1 lA
...
l11 l
1
2
¨ ¨ ¨ l1n
?a1 ok
?an ok
A
!A ok
?a
1
nok ?a2 nok
!A nok
Countering nodes
A
a d
l0 l1
l11
l2 lA
?a ok ?d nok
?a
nok?d
ok
A
!A ok
!A nok
A
a d
l0 l1 lA
l11 l
1
2
?a ok
?d nok
A
!A ok
?a
nok ?d ok
!A nok
Sequential nodes
A
a1 an¨ ¨ ¨
l0 l1
l11
l2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ln lA
?a1 ok ?a2 ok
?a
1
nok
?
a
2
n
o
k ?
a3
no
k
A
!A ok
!A nok
A
a d
l0 l1
l11
l2 lA
?a ok ?d nok
?a
nok
?
d
o
k
A
!A ok
!A nok
Table 2: ADT nodes and corresponding agent models
Adding node attributes. Transformation patterns in Table 2 concern only
an ADT structure. To take attributes values into account, a child must transmit
these to all parents during transition synchronisation. Attributes in a node are
given by the intrinsic value and computation function of the node—see Sec. 2.2
and the EAMAS modification function in item (iii) of Def. 3. For example, the
cost of an AND gate is typically its own cost plus those of all children. Attributes
values are computed after all the node preconditions are satisfied. OR gates in-
volve a choice among children: here, computation happens upon receiving the
message from one child. Conditions associated to ADT countering nodes (e.g.
TS in Fig. 2) are added as guards to the corresponding action transition. Com-
putation functions may be sensitive to the distribution of agents over nodes for
certain gates and attributes. For instance, time computation for AND gates is
typically affected by the parallel operation of multiple agents with the same
goal; but this is not true in general for cost, neither for time in SAND gates. We
illustrate this with our running example7.
Example: EAMAS of the Treasure hunters. Applying the transformation
patterns to the Treasure hunters ADT of Fig. 2 gives the EAMAS in Fig. 3.
Green labels indicate cost and time of each operation. The computation for the
OR gate (GA) depends on the child from which the message is received. The
condition associated to TS is depicted in orange. It checks whether the attack
succeeds, but does not modify its cost nor its time. Time computation for the
AND gate ST uses function timeC , which returns the sum of its arguments if the
children are handled by the same agent (there is one thief) and their maximum
otherwise (two or more thieves collaborate). Note that sequential gates like SAND
enforce the (sequentially) dependent execution of its children regardless of agents
distributions. This models situations of logical dependencies based on the nature
of the attack/defence instead of the resources available. In our example the
thieves must complete stealing the treasure before going away, irrespective of
the number of thieves. Hence the time for the thieves to flee is tTF “ tST ` tGA.
6 Experiments
To demonstrate our approach we implement the transformation patterns in Up-
paal and IMITATOR. With these popular and versatile software tools for quan-
titative verification, we analyse the following case studies from the literature.
6.1 Case studies
Forestalling a software release (forestall). This example, shown in Fig. 4 and
based on a real-world instance [BLP`06], models an attack to the intellectual
property of a company C, by an unlawful competitor company U aiming at
being “first to the market.” Software extraction from C must take place before
U builds it into its own product. Also, U must deploy to market before C, which
can only take place after U integrates the stolen software into its product.
7 Computation functions for agents coalitions are further discussed in Appendix A.
l0 l1
l11
f
tf :“ 120
cf :“ 100
!f ok
!f nok
!f nok
l0 l1
l11
b
tb :“ 60
cb :“ 500
!b ok
!b nok
!b nok
l0 l1
l11
h
th :“ 3
ch :“ 500
!h ok
!h nok
!h nok
l0 l1
l11
e
te :“ 10
!e ok
!e nok
!e nok
l0 l1
l11
p
tp :“ 10
cp :“ 100
!p ok
!p nok
!p nok
l0 l1 l2 lST
l11
?b ok ?f ok ST
tST :“ 2` timeC ptf , tbq
cST :“ cf ` cb
!ST ok
?b
nok
?f
nok
!ST nok
l0 l1 lGA
l11 l
1
2
?h ok
cGA :“ ch, tGA :“ th
?e ok
cGA :“ ce, tGA :“ te
GA !GA ok
?h nok
?e nok
!GA nok
l0 l1
l11
l2 lTF
?ST ok ?GA ok
?ST
nok
?G
A
n
o
k
TF
tTF :“ tST ` tGA
cTF :“ cST ` cGA
!TF ok
!TF nok
l0 l1
l11
l2 lTS
?TF ok ?p nok
?T
F
nok?p
ok
TS
cTS :“ cTF
tTS :“ tTF
10 ą tGA ` 2
!TS ok
!TS nok
Fig. 3: EAMAS network for the ADT shown in Fig. 2.
Compromise IoT device (iot-dev). This case study describes an attack to
an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device either via wireless or wired LAN. Once the
attacker gains access to the private network and has acquired the corresponding
credentials, it can exploit a software vulnerability in the IoT device to run a ma-
licious script. [KSR`18] presents an attack tree for this example as an extension
of the one in [SL15]. The ADT of Fig. 5 enriches that with defence nodes.
Obtain admin privileges (gain-admin). To gain administrative privileges on
a UNIX system, an attacker needs either physical access to an already logged-
in console (entering the computer centre or corrupting an operator) or remote
access via privilege escalation (attacking the SysAdmin). This well-known case
study [Wei91, Edg07, JW08, KPS14, KRS15] exhibits a mostly branching struc-
ture: all gates but one are disjunctions in the original tree from [Wei91]. We
enrich this scenario with the SAND from [KRS15], and add reactive defences. The
full ADT is presented in Fig. 7 of Appendix B.
FS
icp dtm
SC
NAS PRSBRB
bp psc
NA
hebsbhh
id
PR
reb rfchr
scr
(a) ADT
Name Cost Time
bp : bribe programmer e 2k 15 d
psc : progr. steals code e 0 7 d
hh : hire hacker e 1k 20 d
sb : system has a bug e 0 0 d
heb : hacker exploits bug e 0 3 d
id : intrusion detection e 200 1 d
hr : hire robber e 4k 10 d
reb : rob. enters building e 500 3 d
rfc : rob. finds code e 0 0 d
scr : secure coding rooms e 5k 0 d
icp : integr. code in prod. e 2k 15 d
dtm : deploy to market e 1k 5 d
BRB : bribe e 0 3 d
NA : network attack e 0 1 d
NAS : network attack succ. e 0 0 d
PR : physical robbery e 0 0 d
PRS : physical robbery succ. e 0 0 d
SC : steal code e 0 0 d
FS : forestalling of softw. e 0 10 d
(b) Attributes of nodes
Fig. 4: ADT of the forestall case study
CIoTD
esv rms
APNS
APN
CPN
AL
flp sma
AW
fw bwk
GVC
gc tla
inc
(a) ADT
Name Cost Time
flp : find LAN port e 10 1 h
sma : spoof MAC address e 50 30 m
fw : find WLAN e 10 5 h
bwk : break WPA keys e 100 2 h
gc : get credentials e 100 10 h
tla : two-level authentic. e 5 1 m
inc : inform of new connect. e 5 1 m
esv : exploit soft. vulnerab. e 10 1 h
rms : run malicious script e 100 30 m
AL : access LAN e 0 0 h
AW : access WLAN e 0 0 h
CPN : connect to private net. e 0 0 h
GVC : get valid credentials e 0 0 h
APN : access private net. e 0 3 m
APNS : access private net. succ. e 0 1 m
CIoTD : compromise IoT device e 0 0 h
(b) Attributes of nodes
Fig. 5: ADT of the iot-dev case study
6.2 Uppaal
All case studies from Sec. 6.1 were modelled in Uppaal [BDL04, DLL`15], a
state-of-the-art tool for validation and verification of real-time systems. Au-
tomata templates are declared via its GUI and later instantiated for model
verification via PCTL-like queries. This allows a straightforward encoding of
the ADT-to-EAMAS translations as Uppaal templates. Modelling an ADT is
achieved by instantiating these templates. Moreover, support for agents distri-
bution can be easily encoded assigning agents to tree nodes in a dedicated array.
We compared the originalUppaal models from [KRS15, KSR`18] (extended
with defences as detailed in Sec. 6.1) with our EAMAS translations. Our goal
was twofold: on the one hand we verified correctness, checking that reachability
queries (“can the attack succeed?”) and quantitative queries (“what is the time of
the fastest possible attack?”, “what is the cost incurred?”) coincide between our
models and those from [KRS15, KSR`18]; on the other hand (for the EAMAS
translations) we studied the impact of agent coalitions on these metrics.
Uppaal modelling in [KRS15, KSR`18] uses clock variables to represent
time, and clock constraints to encode the duration of attacks and defences. This
is the natural approach in a tool designed for the verification of timed systems,
yet it has two drawbacks when it comes to the analysis of ADTs:
– Uppaal uses abstractions and approximations for time regions that rule out
decidability in the general case [BDL04]. Thus reachability queries like “can
the attack be performed” can at best result in a “this may be true” answer.
In contrast, EAMAS transformations are untimed (see Secs. 2 and 4) and
verification is exact. The price to pay is a larger state space and approxi-
mately 3ˆ longer computation times.
– Unless explicitly encoded case-per-case in the gates, time elapses simulta-
neously for all clocks. Thus, modelling the dependent execution of nodes
requires e.g. using a SAND rather than an AND. This contaminates the struc-
ture of the ADT with the distribution of the agents for analysis. EAMAS
can keep the ADT structure unmodified while studying agents coalitions.
Case study forestall. The minimum time for a successful attack is 43 days, via
the NAND attack gate PRS. Both Uppaal models of the system (EAMAS and
[KRS15]) produced the same correct result. The maximum time for a successful
attack is 92 days: this implies a failed network attack (NA) due to the presence
of the intrusion detection (id) defence, a failed physical robbery (PR) due to
the company’s use of secure coding rooms (scr), and a successful bribery to
a programmer (BRB). Notice that the time for NA, PR, and BR must be added
if we consider the same person is performing all actions, i.e. there is only one
attacker. This cannot be enforced in the Uppaal model from [KRS15] without
sequential OR gates, in the absence of which the query for maximum time yields
“55 days”. The EAMAS Uppaal model can produce the correct result (92 days)
by specifying that a single agent is performing all attacks; and it also yields “55
days” if independent agents are used for the BRB, NA, and PR attacks. In the
case of costs, the cheapest attack is performed via NAS (e 4k) whereas the most
expensive one (e 10500) involves all attacks, with failures of NA and PR due to
the id and scr defences. Both models yield the correct values to these queries.
Case study iot-dev. In this case the same subtree is the source of the fastest
and cheapest attack, via the access LAN strategy (AL) to connect to the private
network (CPN). The minimum cost is e 270 and the maximum one is e 380,
when AW is chosen in addition to AL. The EAMAS and the [KSR`18] Uppaal
models yield correct results. For this ADT both the minimum and maximum
time depend on the agent coalition. This is because the access private network
subtree (APN) is an AND gate, which can be executed in parallel or not depending
on how many attackers are involved. For this reason and given its use of clocks,
the [KSR`18] model can only produce 694 minutes as the fastest attack, which
is correct (and the EAMAS model also computes) when different agents perform
the CPN and GVC attacks. When instead the same agent is used for both attacks,
the EAMAS models returns the correct 784 minutes minimum time. The only
way to achieve this in the [KSR`18] model is to modify the tree, replacing the
AND for a SAND in APN. Furthermore, the longest attack takes 1204 minutes, which
can be computed from the ADT of Fig. 5 by the EAMAS model but not by the
[KSR`18] model without modifications to the tree structure.
Case study gain-admin. The fastest attack takes 2942 minutes via breaking into
the computer centre to access a connected CLI (ACLI through bcc), whereas the
slowest takes 23070 minutes via looking over the SA’s shoulder (LSAS). For full
parallelism of attacks, these values are computed correctly by both the [KRS15]
and the EAMAS models. To study other agent coalitions, [KRS15] suffers from
the same limitations as in the other two case studies. Regarding costs, there are
two cheapest attacks (e 100) via either GAPS or TSA. The most expensive attack
(e 15820) is the summation of the costs of all attack leaves. Again both values
are correctly computed by the two models. The reachability query “is an attack
feasible?”is computed for the EAMAS model in a few milliseconds, whereas it
takes more than three minutes for the [KRS15] model. This is a consequence
of the reduction techniques applied to timed-systems where reachability is non-
trivial; in contrast, the full state space exploration in the EAMAS model can
quickly reach the goal state starting from the csa or co leaves. As discussed
earlier, state space bloating in the EAMAS model impacts quantitative queries.
6.3 Imitator
IMITATOR (www.imitator.fr, [AFKS12]) is a model-checker for Parametric
Timed Automata [AHV93]. Models are composed of automata that synchronise
on shared transitions (actions); in ADTs this involves message passing between
a child and its parent(s), where all combinations must be explicit for DAGs.
We modelled our running example in IMITATOR as the EIIS of Fig. 3. Cost
and time are constants for the nodes with fixed attributes—see the table in
Fig. 2b—and variables for the remaining nodes. We could verify that location
lTS is reachable in the model, i.e. the attack is feasible for the selected attributes
values. This holds even for a single attacker, since GA must be done after ST, and
the police is alerted as soon as b and f succeed (but before ST does).
Moreover, we considered the question “To catch the thieves, what is the max-
imum time the police can take to arrive?” This requires synthesising a value for
the time attribute of the p node, which becomes a model parameter. IMITATOR
computed that the police can take at most 5 minutes to prevent the burglary.
For the three case studies of Sec. 6.1, the min/max costs and times were
also found by state space exploration with IMITATOR, confirming the results
obtained with Uppaal. Regarding parameter synthesis, we considered an attack
is successful if its associated defence was slower: (i) for forestall, we computed
that id should take at most 1 day to block NA—since NAS is a failed reactive
defence, id is triggered as soon as heb succeeds, and has to finish faster than
the intrinsic time of NA; (ii) for iot-dev, inc is effective iff it takes at most
3 minutes; (iii) finally, for gain-admin we proved that whatever the time for tla,
an attack is feasible (as GSAP is a disjunction), and hence the other defences are
required.
7 Conclusion and Future work
In this work we revisited attack-defence trees under a unified syntax, extending
the usual constructs with a new sequential counter-operator. Our syntax framed
this extension naturally among the other constructs, and in accordance to the
chosen semantics and other related work. More importantly, we extended AMAS
to model ADTs in an agent-aware formalism—EAMAS—and provided trans-
formation patterns from ADT constructs to agent models. Our ADT–EAMAS
transformation preserves the compositional system description, ensuring a suc-
cinct state space where reachability queries can be efficiently checked. EAMAS
models decorate all ADT nodes with attributes and an operating agent. We ex-
ploited this flexibility to analyse (via Uppaal on three case studies) the impact
of different agent coalitions on attack/defence performance metrics such as time
and cost. Finally, we analised the feasibility of specific goals using IMITATOR:
we synthesised parameters (i.e. attribute values of ADT nodes) rendering an
attack/defence feasible, or we proved them infeasible. Overall, our experimental
results show how different agent distributions affect the time of attacks/defence
strategies, possibly rendering some infeasible. We expect this will open the gate
to richer studies of real-world security scenarios, with multiple distinct agents.
Our next objectives include designing logics to express properties of EA-
MAS, and adapt the partial order reduction (POR) methodology presented
in [JPDM18] to reason about the abilities of agents in EAMAS models. More-
over, we will extend this to handling parametric timing information. Finally, we
plan to extend our tool that currently transforms ADTs into EAMAS models,
to automatically generate IMITATOR and Uppaal models.
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A Computation functions for EAMAS agents
To model and study the impact of different strategies and agent coalitions on
ADTs, computation functions for node attributes are a versatile solution. In
our running example, the computation function for the time of the attack gate
ST “ ANDpb, fq can be generically expressed with functions f and g:
f pinit timepSTq, gpinit timepbq, init timepfqqq
§ f “ ` necessarily, because the operations involved in stealing the treasure
depend logically on the completion of both children nodes, and
§ g depends on the agent coalition: if two or more thieves cooperate then
g “ max; but if there is a single attacker then g “ `.
Fig. 6: Running example: the treasure hunters
TS
pTF
ST
b f
GA
h e
(a) ADT
Name Cost Time
TS (treasure stolen)
p (police) 100e 10 min
TF (thieves fleeing)
ST (steal treasure) 2 min
b (bribe gatekeeper) 500e 1 h
f (force arm. door) 100e 2 h
GA (go away)
h (helicopter) 500e 3 min
e (emergency exit) 10 min
Condition for TS:
init timeppq ą timepSTq ` timepGAq
(b) Attributes of nodes
In the general case, the children of a gate will be subtrees L and R rather
than leaves, which allows more complex computations of potential parallelism
between the agents in L and R. One could for instance encode a simple worst-case
scenario: take an AND gate involving agents A, and let AL Ď A (resp. AR Ď A)
be all agents from subtree L (resp. R). Then make the time of the gate be either
§ the sum of the times taken to complete L and R if AL X AR ‰ ∅, because
then some agents are present in both children of the AND, or
§ the maximum between these times otherwise, because then L and R are fully
independent.
Furthermore, the sharing of children nodes by different gates in DAG ADTs
can also be captured in any desired way, by a careful choice of the computation
functions for each attribute. Take for instance the tree
ANDpSAND1pa1, a2q, SAND2pa2, a3qq (1)
where a1, a2, a3 are attack leaves and SAND1, SAND2 are standard SAND gates. Due
to the sequential operation of these gates, the computation function for the time
attribute of SAND1 must be timepSAND1q “ init timepSAND1q ` init timepa1q `
init timepa2q, and analogously for SAND2. However, the time of the full AND attack
is
timepANDq “
3ÿ
i“1
init timepaiq `
2ÿ
j“1
init timepSANDjq. (2)
In particular, even for a single agent, init timepa2q must be counted only once:
when SAND1 finishes, it means that a2 has already been completed for SAND2 too.
To encode this compositionally via computation functions, one must operate
at the level of the parent(s) that close the DAG loop, e.g. the AND in equation (1).
This is because only at those nodes the sharing of children piq can be realised,
and piiq it may have an impact in computations: timepSAND1q considered indi-
vidually is not influenced by operations in SAND2.
Let us finally analyse time computations for a coalition of two agents, i.e.
two attackers cooperate. In this case, SAND1 and SAND2 can neither operate in
parallel, because a2 is the same attack for both gates. The root cause of this
restriction is that the tree in equation (1) is isomorphic to SANDpa1, a2, a3q, so
equation (2) is the only correct way to compute timepANDq, regardless of agent
coalitions. Again, computation functions can encode this by operating at the
level of the AND gate, where the shared children in the DAG re-join.
B Case study: gain-admin
Fig. 7: ADT of the gain-admin case study
OAP
ACLI
co
ECCS
ECC
bcc ccg
scr
GSAP
GAPS
GAP
opf fgp
tla
LSAS
LSA
bsa vsa sat
nv
TSA
th
DTH
wd efw
csa
(a) ADT
Name Cost Time
co : corrupt operator e 4k 4 d
bcc : break-in comp. centre e 6k 2 d
ccg : c.c. guest unwatched e 100 5 d
scr : secure coding rooms e 5k 0 d
opf : obtain password file e 100 3 d
fgp : find guessable pass. e 0 1 d
tla : two-level authentic. e 5 1 m
bsa : befriend Sys. Admin. e 500 14 d
vsa : visit SA at work e 20 2 d
sat : spy SA terminal e 0 30 m
nv : no-visits policy e 0 0 d
th : trojan horse SA e 100 3 d
wd : watchdog sys. daemon e 2k 5 m
efw : E-Mail firewall e 3k 0 m
csa : corrupt Sys. Admin. e 5k 5 d
ECC : enter computer centre e 0 0 d
ECCS : enter c.c. successful e 0 1 h
GAP : get admin password e 0 10 m
GAPS : GAP successful e 0 2 m
LSA : look over SA shoulder e 0 0 m
LSAS : LSA successful e 0 0 m
DTH : defence against trojans e 0 0 m
TSA : trojan horse for SA e 0 0 m
ACLI : access c.c. CLI e 0 2 m
GSAP : get SA password e 0 0 m
OAP : obtain admin privileges e 0 0 m
(b) Attributes of nodes
